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1. Introduction
The intervention of governments providing financial help has received a
lot of attention due to the recent financial crisis. There has been a lot of
academic debate on the ‘bailing out’ of financial institutions.  Especially,
the use of tax payers’ money to support financial institutions has been
controversially disputed as providing perverse incentives to investors
and managers of financial institutions. Here it is not possible to
summarize the whole debate, but it has become clear from the debate
and the many examples of ad hoc intervention into financial markets
that a more structural and more market-oriented approach to tackle with
financial crises is needed. In this article, we would like to propose and to
elaborate on such a vehicle that is inspired by insights from the
insurance of large-scale natural disasters. 
In many countries, governments generously intervene in all kinds of
different forms to provide compensation to victims of a variety of natural
or technological catastrophes.  In some cases, ex post direct
compensation is paid to victims; in other cases, the government acts as
reinsurer of last resort (e.g. as far as terrorism is concerned) to deal with
uninsurability of catastrophic risks. 
We argue that, like in the case of natural disasters (or terrorism), a multi-
layered approach, including insurance and government intervention,
may be a better solution than the various forms of bail-out of financial
institutions as they occurred between 2007 and 2012. We aim to provide
arguments of how such a multi-layered insurance system could work and
how possible objections could be met. Of course, this article is only a step
towards developing such an insurance solution; some issues regarding
the practical implementation of our proposal may have to be addressed
in further research.  
The remainder of our article is set up as follows: first, it is simply asked
the question why there would not be an insurance against financial crisis,
and the conditions are sketched under which this would be feasible
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government intervenes, but to a relatively limited extent (Section 3). This
leads us to a proposal for a structural multi-layered approach whereby
insurance could play a role in case of financial crisis and the role of
government would be reduced to the one of a reinsurer of last resort
(Section 4). We end the contribution with a few concluding remarks
(Section 5).
2. The Problem and a Conditional Support
2.1 Bailing out Criticized
After the financial crisis, financial institutions were on a large scale
‘bailed out’ by national governments via a variety of different techniques.
This bailing out gave rise to substantial criticism in the literature, which
can be summarized as follows: the injection of money into financial
institutions took place on an ad hoc basis to avoid financial contagion
and systemic risks of the financial sector. As a consequence, some
financial institutions received financial support whereas others did not
and went bankrupt. It were especially the larger financial institutions
that benefited from state aid. ‘Too big to fail’ was often heard in that
respect. 
Notwithstanding the criticism that has been formulated on bail-outs,
some form of government intervention in case of financial crisis may be
unavoidable. It is related to the concept of a so-called systemic risk. This
is referred to as the possibility that one firm's failure will result in large
damages to the economy as a whole.  To some extent a government
intervention in case of financial crisis may therefore be unavoidable. The
question, however, arises whether this government intervention in case
of financial crisis should take the form of the current ad hoc bail-out or
whether more structural solutions would not be more desirable. 
Would it theoretically be possible to insure against financial crisis?
Corporations use insurance on a large scale, and the literature has
indicated that the market conditions in which insurance operates provide
an important tool to manage corporate risks.  However, several reasons
can be advanced which would make insurance of a financial crisis
difficult. A first problem that may arise is the predictability of the risk.
Insurance is possible to the extent that risks remain predictable.  It
supposes that actuarially fair information is available on which the
insurer can base his calculus of the likelihood that the insured event will
occur. Factual and legal uncertainties may endanger this ex ante
predictability.  Financial crisis may for obvious reasons be problematic
in that respect for the simple reason that reliable statistics to predict
such a crisis may be lacking. This point is stressed, for example, by
Acharya et al.  who claim that the availability of reliable data and
transparency was a major trigger of the recent financial crisis. Thus, a
precondition for insurance of financial crises would be to create more
transparency and making data available. 
A second problem relates to the fact that the insured risk has to be
exogenous in the sense that the insured himself cannot influence the risk.
Endogeneity may be a serious problem  to the extent that it will usually
not be the financial crisis as such that will be the subject of insurance,
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as a result of the crisis. The risk of endogeneity will hence pop up, if it is
impossible to determine whether business failure occurred as a result of
the crisis or rather because of other causes. For that reason, traditionally
it was held that the enterprise risk itself is in principle not insurable. The
main reason advanced for refusing to insure the enterprise risk would be
that this risk would not be predictable and hence an actuarially fair
premium could not be calculated. 
The main reason why insuring enterprise risk is considered problematic
is of course linked to the well-known problems of moral hazard and
adverse selection. Not only will insurance increase the demand for risky
activities, but it will also be particularly attractive for those who need it
most. That is of course precisely the problem of adverse selection,
identified by Arrow.  The main problem both with moral hazard and
with adverse selection is the information asymmetry between the insurer
and the enterprise.  If insurers would not be able to distinguish whether
the enterprise risk is exogenous (caused by a financial crisis) or
endogenous (e.g. caused by mismanagement), incurable moral hazard
would make the risk uninsurable. 
The final reason why damage resulting from a financial crisis may not be
insurable is simply that the damage resulting from a financial crisis may
largely outweigh the possibilities of commercial insurers and even
reinsurers. Hence, it might be argued that capacity is lacking to cover
this type of catastrophic financial risk.
2.2 A Conditional Support
The problems identified in the previous section should by all means be
taken seriously. There are, however, remedies available as a result of
which they are not necessarily incurable. 
Looking first at the issue of predictability, financial crises may
technically be difficult to predict. However, the subprime mortgage crisis
was certainly not the first global financial crisis. In addition, with the
emergence of this crisis additional information has become available to
make better estimates of the likelihood of future financial crises.
Moreover, the literature has equally indicated that a lack of reliable
statistics does not necessarily make a risk uninsurable. Kunreuther et
al.  have argued that insurers can respond to this so-called ‘insurer
ambiguity’ by charging a risk premium to account for the uncertainty
following from the ‘hard-to-predict’ nature of an event. 
The main issue is indeed the exogenous character of the risk. From the
literature, various tools are known to remedy the moral hazard
problem.  If moral hazard can be adequately controlled, the insured in
fact behaves as if no insurance were available. The crucial question is
hence, as also Von der Schulenburg noted,  whether more information
can be made available to adequately control the moral hazard problem.
As far as financial crisis is concerned, the key issue will of course be for
insurers only to intervene when damage resulting from business failure
was effectively caused by the financial crisis and not by causes which lay
in the behaviour of the insured himself and hence could have been
prevented (e.g. mismanagement). To the extent insurers invest in risk
classification and risk management, they will also be able to obtain
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risk (financial crisis) or from an endogenous factor.  
Probably the major problem still in the insurance of systemic risks
generally may be the capacity issue. Although techniques such as
pooling, co-insurance and reinsurance undoubtedly have increased the
capacity of the traditional insurance market,  the traditional problem
with the insurance of risks of a catastrophic nature is that traditional
insurance markets may lack the capacity to deal with those catastrophic
risks.  At this point, the question arises whether government could step
in as a lender or reinsurer of last resort to support the functioning of
insurance markets where they would otherwise (due to capacity
problems) fail. We will now turn to a case where such a role for
government already exists, being in insurance of catastrophes.
3. Insurance for Catastrophes
Many law and economics scholars favour insurance solutions for
catastrophic risks especially when compared with the alternative of
government-provided compensation. For example, Epstein  qualifies
government intervention as a ‘catastrophic response to catastrophic risk’,
meaning that it will dilute the incentives to develop insurance solutions.
Also scholars as Priest,  Kaplow,  and Skees and Barnett  have
pointed at the advantages of insurance in dealing with catastrophic risk:
insurance better enables an adequate risk differentiation and risk
spreading, and if insurance markets are competitive, insurers can be
assumed to be better able to deal with classic insurance problems, such
as moral hazard and adverse selection. A similar point has been made by
Kunreuther, who already since 1968 argues in favour of insurance
solutions for disasters.  
The argument in favour of government intervention is that, without
government support, insurance coverage for disasters would simply not
have developed.  
Reinsurance by the state can then be considered as an adequate method
to resolve the uninsurability problem. A condition is of course that the
government charges an actuarially fair premium for its intervention. This
type of government intervention has, moreover, the advantage that ex
post relief sponsored through the public purse can be avoided. Where the
government acts as reinsurer, this at least has the advantage that a
premium can be paid by those who actually cause or run the risk. It can
thus facilitate market solutions, still provide incentives for prevention to
potential victims and avoid a negative redistribution from tax payers to
victims. Thus a state intervention as reinsurer may avoid the
‘catastrophic responses to catastrophic risks’.  
Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan  also argued in favour of this type of
government-provided reinsurance. They argue that one advantage is that
the government has the capacity to diversify the risks over the entire
population and to spread past losses to future generations, thus creating
a form of cross-time diversification which the private market could not
achieve. On the other hand, they argue that, especially as far as terrorism
is concerned, government participation in insurance programmes is
crucial since the risk of terrorist attacks is partly in the government's
control and the government can have more information on on-going
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Of course, it is not difficult to point at many differences between natural
disasters or terrorism on the one hand and the financial crisis on the
other. For example, the absolute economic impact of the financial crisis
can be huge because of the worldwide interrelatedness of banks, issuers
of securities and industry. Natural and technological disasters can have
widespread severe damages as well, but the disasters are usually limited
to a certain population and some foreseeability of the budget for
compensating victims may be possible. 
A second difference is that the causes of natural disasters or terrorism
can usually be easily defined. In a financial crisis, it is not so easy to
determine whether the economic failure of a firm traces back to the
financial crisis or may be induced by general mismanagement. Hence the
endogeneity of the risk may be a much more serious problem in case of a
financial crisis. 
Despite these problems, the case of catastrophes shows that a multi-
layered approach could also be applicable to the insurance of financial
intermediaries whereby the advantages of insurance (with the
possibilities of risk differentiation) are used to the full extent (thus
providing incentives to the prevention of risks), when government only
intervenes as reinsurer or lender of last resort to provide capacity where
commercial (re)insurance markets would fail.
4. Proposal
4.1 A Structural Approach
First we would suggest dealing ex ante with the possibility of losses due
to a financial crisis in a structural way rather than ad hoc and ex post.
This aims (via insurance) at implementing market solutions for
compensating victims of financial crisis. Hence, compensation will no
longer be ad hoc, but structural. 
Second, government intervention should be (like in the case of terrorism
or natural catastrophes) limited to intervening there where private
insurance markets fail due to lacking capacities. Hence, the government
intervention will be limited and compensation will be partly paid by
private insurance companies. 
An apparent advantage of this structural approach is its pre-emptive
effect on financial crises. Since insurance companies will have to
permanently monitor insured companies, in order to make adequate risk
assessments and to adapt insurance premiums, there will be a constant
flow of information regarding a company's financial status, business
model and management capacity. While yet ‘due diligence’ of companies
takes place almost exclusively in the event of mergers or initial public
offerings  and it is also questionable whether regular audits by
accounting firms make a proper assessment of a company's financial
status,  the engagement of insurance companies would be an additional
safeguard for providing proper information on a company's financial
status. 
Of course, insurance markets alone may not have enough capacity to
insure a financial crisis. But the comparison with natural disasters
teaches that it is possible to still use insurance but only up to the level
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system has to be introduced allowing government to intervene as a
reinsurer of last resort for the large losses where insurance markets
would miss capacity.
4.2 A Multi-Layered Approach
From the discussion of financial compensation for victims of
catastrophes in Section 3, it could be learned that a multi-layered
approach can be introduced whereby a first layer is typically born by the
victims themselves. The second layer of losses is covered by private
insurance companies and reinsurance. The third layer of losses is
covered by the public budget whereby the government becomes a
reinsurer of last resort. This model, so we propose, also has capacity to
be applied to potential losses caused by a financial crisis. 
While it is not likely that the economic risks of a financial crisis can be
fully insured by private insurers, because insurers are highly intertwined
with financial markets and because of the sheer amount of funds that are
needed, the introduction of private insurance can reduce the risk that the
public spends subsidies to firms, which are in trouble even without
financial crisis. More technically spoken, a multi-layered insurance
programme can serve as a screening device that reduces the likelihood of
granting non-eligible subsidies, when a public agency has to decide on a
huge amount of applications for subsidies in a short time. 
The first layer of a multi-layered insurance programme is typically the
requirement that the insurance holder bears a part of the costs by
himself.  This is an incentive for firms not to engage in moral hazard,
but it may also help to overcome adverse selection. For example, the
requirement to hold enough equity to compensate temporary losses may
be understood as a sort of obligation for firms to self-insure a part of the
losses in the event of a financial crisis. Thus the here proposed first layer
of insurance is similar to the minimum capital requirements laid down in
the Basel Accords. But the here proposed self-insurance may deviate
from the Basel capital requirements. Although the self-insurance of the
first layer must not be lower than the Basel capital requirements, it may
be higher in order to contract a lower premium with the insurer. Thus,
the Basel Accords can be understood as an internationally recognized
safeguard against financial instability of banks, while the requirement of
self-insurance aims primarily at preventing moral hazard, when
insurance against financial crises becomes possible. 
At the second layer, private insurers offer risk-adjusted insurance
contracts to firms, which will cover the risk of becoming illiquid and
which will guarantee the maintenance of a firm's operations. Although in
case of a severe financial crisis this private part of the financial safety net
will often not be sufficient to rescue all firms, it will nevertheless
contribute to financial stability. However, the most significant aspect of
the second layer is that insurers will undertake investigations (e.g. due
diligence and stress tests) in order to calculate the risk-adjusted
premiums for firms. Moreover, an adequate monitoring by the insurer
should also enable the insurer to predict whether his particular insured
financial institution is more or less reliable and hence risk-adjusted
premiums could be charged. Insurance companies could, of course, also
face uncertainty, concerning the probability of not only the insured event
31
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occurring, but also the potential losses, but that is precisely why a multi-
layered system is designed to keep the potential risk exposure of the
insurer in the second layer limited. Once the amount exceeds the second
layer, government will intervene. 
The crucial issue is that the insurer engages in a careful monitoring of
the insured financial institution. Even if an international and coherent
public financial monitoring system would be in place, as for example
suggested by the Larosiere-report (2009), a monitoring by insurance
companies seems to be advantageous, or at least an important
complement to public monitoring. The reason is that competition
between insurance companies sets incentives for the insurers not only to
make correct risk assessments, but also to further develop the
assessment techniques. This means high-powered market incentives
would trigger insurance companies to make correct risk assessments,
thereby employing cut-edge technologies to correctly assess the risk. This
is again supported by experiences with large natural disasters, where
reinsurers not only have fairly good statistical models to assess the risk,
but also can recommend the insured how to better protect against the
risk. 
At the third layer, the public steps in as a ‘re-insurer of last resort’ and
may grant subsidies. While at the second layer private insurance
companies can only diversify risk horizontally between actual firms of a
risk pool, government can diversify the risks over the entire population
of firms and spread past losses to future taxpayers, which is a sort of
cross-time diversification of risk that private insurance markets cannot
achieve.  Because of the information that is generated by private
insurance firms on the second layer and the signals that are freely given
by firms on the first layer, public agencies can make timely decisions on
subsidies with a considerably reduced failure rate.
4.3 Specific Aspects
A first aspect concerns the question for whom this multi-layered
framework should be provided as a protection against financial crisis.
Theoretically, the system could be applicable both to financial
intermediaries and to companies in the real economy. However, the
bailing out (for which we precisely want to present an alternative)
especially took place as far as financial intermediaries are concerned. 
When referring to financial institutions, the first target of our system is
obviously banks, including both retail and investment banks. The policy
maker could envisage enlarging the system to include others as well in
the system, such as investment companies. An important reason for
including those as well is that the failure of those investment companies
could also have a systemic nature, which is precisely the reason to start
the system in the first place. 
A second issue is how one distinguishes whether losses are caused by a
financial crisis. This problem is as such not new. It also appears in the
insurance of natural catastrophes where, for example, in France specific
insurance coverage is only provided when damage is caused by a natural
catastrophe. Hence, in France it has to be determined whether an event
can be classified as a natural catastrophe. Likewise in our case, it will
have to be determined whether a financial problem can be classified as a
32
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financial crisis, as a result of which the proposed system will be
triggered. The example of France shows that the government will take an
administrative decision declaring a particular event a natural
catastrophe.  A similar system could thus be used in our model:
government could declare a particular stressful financial situation ‘a
financial crisis’ as a result of which the multi-layered approach will be
triggered. In addition, there could be arguments for shifting the decision
on declaring an event a financial crisis to an independent party, in order
to avoid political interference. One may consider the central bank playing
a crucial role or a financial supervisory authority. 
With regard to the fact that a financial crisis might not occur
spontaneously like an earthquake, but may be triggered in the beginning
by small events that are not identified as crisis symptoms, the proposed
insurance approach is advantageous. This is because insurers have to
examine in regular intervals the financial status and business model of
banks, in order to adjust premiums. In addition, banks could nominate
compliance officers, who are in charge to correctly report financial
figures to the insurers. It can be expected that through these
investigations financial risks become earlier detected and counter-
measures can timely be launched. 
A third and complicated issue is whether a multi-layered coverage
system for financial crisis should be made mandatory. Here the parallel
with natural catastrophes may not be that obvious. In the case of natural
catastrophes, the system is often made mandatory (like in France and in
Belgium). The arguments supporting compulsory insurance for natural
disasters are that potential victims largely underestimate risks.
However, these behavioural arguments based on limited information and
bounded rationality, which support mandatory insurance in the case of
natural catastrophes, may not apply in the case of financial
intermediaries. There is obviously a major difference between mandatory
insurance for disasters on the one hand and insurance for financial crisis
on the other. Disaster insurance is focused on problems of civilians who
may lose their houses and employment opportunities when their houses
(or employer's businesses) are destroyed in an earthquake or a flood. The
story is a different one when considering insurance by financial
institutions against a financial crisis. Much of the benefit of the
insurance is for shareholders or bondholders of the financial institutions,
who are already protected by deposit-guarantee schemes. That may make
the argument for mandatory insurance much stronger in case of natural
disasters than in case of financial crisis. As a starting point, the system
should therefore be voluntary. This implies that a separating equilibrium
is created to distinguish between the good and the bad risks. Those who
would not seek insurance coverage (presumably the bad risks) would
then also not be bailed out, in order to preserve the credibility of the
system. 
The problem is, however, that the starting point to create the system in
the first place was that financial risks are systemic. In other words,
destabilization of one financial intermediary (like Lehman Brothers)
could lead to the destabilization of the entire economy. If the system is
supposed to prevent these kinds of systemic risks, there may be an
argument in making it mandatory. Indeed, if the scheme were merely
voluntary, adverse selection would be a major concern: banks that are
33
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‘too big to fail’ would have no incentives to purchase insurance because
in case of a crisis, they would be counting on government support.
Mandatory insurance may address this problem. However, this may
create the problem that there could be a pooling equilibrium in which it
is no longer possible to distinguish between good and bad risks.
Moreover, a system of mandatory insurance often leads to a cross-
subsidisation whereby good risks finance bad risks.  The question
therefore arises whether it is possible, even under mandatory insurance,
to attain a separating equilibrium, in other words, distinguishing
between good and bad risks. Again, the example of natural catastrophes
may be instructive. For example, in Belgium there is mandatory
insurance against flooding, included in the fire insurance. However,
premiums are not fixed and can hence be differentiated. Thus good risks
(e.g. protecting themselves with preventive measures against flooding)
can, even in a mandatory insurance system, still be rewarded as a result
of risk differentiation. 
A fourth issue is that our model, of course, assumes that the insurer will
play an important role in the second layer as financial risk manager by
differentiating risks and thus controlling moral hazard. A particular
problem that may arise is that insurance companies themselves can also
be part of larger financial institutions, which may inhibit their
independence in judging the financial performance of institutions with
which they may have financial linkages. In those cases, guarantees need
to be provided concerning the independent assessment by the insurance
company. Some private insurance companies may be underestimating
financial risks themselves, like apparently the large US-based insurer
AIG did. Insurance companies therefore have to rely on independent
third-party opinion and expertise when performing their monitoring
task. The key element in our model is indeed that insurers will, being
exposed to risk, have incentives to adequately monitor the performance
of financial institutions. This, of course, supposes a sufficient
independence from the financial institutions that they insure and hence
have to monitor (‘Chinese walls’). 
A final issue might be that one could argue that the premiums would be
so high that an effective insurance against systemic risk would practically
not be possible. One may argue that the sheer amount of money needed
cannot be provided by insurance. This must not be the case, because
there would always be the government with its possibility of cross-time
diversification of risk. But there are also examples, where in the
aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007 countries started to build-up a
sort of insurance for large financial intermediaries. For example, in 2011
in Germany a bank levy became effective. Banks and other financial
intermediaries have to pay up into a fund, which is meant to stabilize the
banking sector in case of a financial crisis. The levy is according to the
systemic relevance of the bank and the financial risk of the bank.
5. Concluding Remarks
In this contribution, insights are transferred from the theory and practice
of insuring technological and natural disasters to the idea of insuring the
financial risk of financial intermediaries in case of a financial crisis.
Although technological and natural catastrophes are certainly different
35
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from financial crises in many respects, it is striking that both events have
similar features in regard to the problems that an adequate insurance for
both risks has to overcome. 
Notwithstanding our optimistic stance, we are aware that our proposal is
only a first step on the way to an insurance approach towards the
avoidance and management of financial crises. One of the crucial
questions is clearly how insurance companies can actually act as
financial risk managers and which instruments they can employ to
control financial institutions; another issue is how the system would
precisely work if a financial crisis would occur, i.e. how the decision to
compensate would be taken and what amounts would precisely be
compensated. This is clearly also related to the possible interaction
between the three layers whereby a central issue remains how the
institutional framework can be shaped to provide adequate incentives to
all stakeholders involved in the three layers. It clearly went beyond the
scope of this article to address those issues in detail. Working out how
insurance for financial crises may work concretely will be the subject of
further research.
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